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ABSTRACT
Many sectors of the United States economy have 
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
study examines how deregulation affects the 
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in 
deregulation industries. In this study, the 
informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the 
earnings response coefficient (ERG, the slope coefficient 
in the regression of abnormal stock returns on unexpected 
accounting earnings). The effects of deregulation on ERCs 
are examined by (1) comparing ERCs before deregulation to 
those after deregulation to determine the changes in the 
magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation, (2) investigating 
the time series of ERCs after deregulation to determine 
the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation, and (3) comparing the change in ERCs in one 
deregulated industry to that in another deregulated 
industry to determine the differential effects of 
deregulation.
Results indicate that changes in the magnitude of 
ERCs due to deregulation and differences in the changes in 
the magnitude of ERCs among the three industries examined 
are found in some cases but only when variables found to 
be determinants of ERCs in previous studies are not
iv
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included in the regression models. In other words, after 
controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence is 
found for a significant impact of industry deregulation on 
ERCs.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Many sectors of the United States economy have 
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
deregulation encompasses diverse industries such as 
airline, natural gas, and trucking. While the main goal 
of deregulation is to improve the performance of the 
affected industries by stimulating competition, 
deregulation also increases investor uncertainty about 
future prospects for the firms in the affected industries. 
A number of studies (e.g., Bundt et al. 1992; Chen and 
Sanger 1985; Fraser and Kannan 1990) find empirical 
evidence of increases in systematic risk associated with 
deregulation. However, Cunningham et al. (1988) find that 
for airline industry the increase in systematic risk was 
temporary, and it was followed by a period in which 
systematic risk fell to a level below or about equal to 
that in the regulated period.
While a number of prior studies investigate the 
impact of deregulation on the risk of deregulated firms, 
this study examines how deregulation affects the 
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in 
deregulated industries. In this study, the 
informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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earnings response coefficient (ERC, the slope coefficient 
in the regression of abnormal stock returns on unexpected 
accounting earnings). The ERC is the magnitude of the 
share price response per unit of unexpected earnings. 
Earnings numbers of firms with large ERCs are more 
informative than those of firms with small ERCs because 
for any given unexpected earnings, relative share price 
responses of firms with large ERCs will be higher than 
those of firms with small ERCs. The effects of 
deregulation on ERCs are examined by; (1) comparing ERCs 
before deregulation to those after deregulation to 
determine the changes in the magnitude of ERCs due to 
deregulation, (2) investigating the time series of ERCs 
after deregulation to determine the intertemporal 
variation of ERCs following deregulation, and (3) 
comparing the change in ERCs in one deregulated industry 
to that in another deregulated industry to determine the 
differential effects of deregulation.
To implement these examinations, a sample of firms 
are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey. 
Regression models are developed to test the hypothesized 
effects of deregulation on ERCs. Variables found to be 
determinants of ERCs in previous research are included in 
some of the regression models to control for the effects 
of these variables on ERCs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
Motivation
Beginning with the seminal work of Ball and Brown 
(1968), many studies provide evidence of a positive 
correlation between unexpected earnings and unexpected 
stock returns.* The results of these studies strongly 
support the hypothesis that accounting earnings numbers 
contain information relevant for security valuation. 
However, a simple regression of unexpected returns on 
unexpected earnings generally explains only a small 
portion of the variations of unexpected returns around 
earnings announcement dates. Hagerman et al. (1984) 
suggest that the low explanatory power indicates that 
factors other than the magnitude of unexpected earnings 
affect the stock price responses to earnings 
announcements, and this study investigates whether 
deregulation is such a factor. Identification of factors 
affecting the magnitude of stock price responses to 
earnings announcements provides insight into whether and 
how information (e.g. whether the firm is in a regulated 
industry or not) affects the way accounting numbers are 
utilized by stock market participants in firm valuation.
This study hypothesizes that deregulation affects 
both cross-sectional and intertemporal variations of ERCs.
‘See, for example. Brown and Kennelly (1972), Latané 
and Jones (1977, 1979), Beaver et al. (1979), Rendleman et 
al. (1982), Hagerman et al. (1984), among others.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
Prior studies have found that ERCs are related to various 
firm-specific factors (e.g., earnings persistence,
Kormendi and Lipe 1987) and changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (e.g., risk-free interest rates, Collins and 
Kothari 1989). However, the firm-specific factors and the 
changes in macroeconomic conditions studied affect either 
the cross-sectional or intertemporal variation of ERCs, 
but not both. This study adds to this line of literature 
by suggesting a factor which potentially affects both 
cross-sectional and intertemporal variations of ERCs.
Moreover, a number of prior studies examine the 
impact of deregulation on firm systematic risk. This 
study extends prior research by examining the effects of 
deregulation in a different area: the informativeness of 
accounting earnings. Determination of whether 
deregulation affects the stock price responses to earnings 
announcements is informative about the effects of 
deregulation. Many important industries of the U.S. 
economy were deregulated during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
it is possible that other industries will be deregulated 
in the future. Therefore, it is important to understand 
the impact of deregulation.
Furthermore, this study can also help validate the 
results of two prior studies. First, Teets (1992) finds 
that on average, ERCs of electric utilities are 
significantly less than those of nonregulated firms, and
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he suggests that regulation is a determinant of ERCs. 
However, as acknowledged by Teets (1992, 284), since only 
one regulated industry is included in his study, it is 
difficult to determine whether "regulation per se or some 
other characteristic of [electric] utilities" is 
responsible for the smaller ERCs. This study represents a 
more direct test of the hypothesis that regulation is a 
determinant of ERCs by comparing ERCs before deregulation 
to those after deregulation. Therefore, it should provide 
further evidence as to the validity of Teets's assertion.
Secondly, Lang (1991) finds evidence of a decline in 
the magnitude of the ERCs over time following firms' 
initial public offerings. Lang (1991, 231) suggests that 
his model could be applied to other situations, and in 
particular to events "which substantially increase 
investor uncertainty about the future prospects of the 
firm (e.g., industry deregulation ... )." By 
investigating the time series of ERCs after deregulation, 
this study should provide insight into the 
generalizability of Lang's model.
Historical Background of Regulation 
Airlines
Congress adopted the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. 
This Act created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to 
regulate interstate air carriers. In order to engage in 
scheduled airline service, a firm had to first obtain a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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certificate of public convenience and necessity from the 
CAB. The certificate specified which routes could be 
served. Applicants of certificates had to show that 
proposed services were "in the public interest and that 
they would not harm the incumbent carriers" (Kaplan 1986, 
42) . The CAB approved a very low percentage of route 
authority applications by existing airlines to serve new 
routes or routes served by other carriers (Slovin et al. 
1991, 233) . In addition, as airlines were required to 
serve routes listed on their certificates, they could not 
discontinue routes without CAB approval. Therefore, 
airlines had little flexibility on what routes they 
served.
In regulating fares, the CAB's primary concern was on 
the overall industry profitability rather than on the 
relationship between fares and costs in particular 
markets. The CAB used distance as the primary factor in 
determining fares while the actual cost per passenger mile 
of providing air service declines with distance. As a 
result, fares in long-haul markets were above the costs of 
service while fares in short-haul markets were kept below 
costs (Kaplan 1986, 43).
Beginning in 1976, the CAB started to reduce its 
control over airfares and routes, and with public support 
for deregulation, the Airline Deregulation Act was signed 
into law in October 1978 (Kaplan 1986, 45) . The Act ended
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the CAB'S authority over routes on December 31, 1981, and 
its authority over fares on January l, 1983. The Act also 
ratified the liberal fare flexibility and route award 
policies that the CAB had already adopted. For the most 
part, the CAB's regulation on fares and routes ended 
sooner than mandated in the Airline Deregulation Act 
(Kaplan 1986, 47) .
With increased fare flexibility, carriers have 
adopted a variety of pricing strategies. These include 
restricted discount fares, quantity discounts, and 
frequent flyer discounts. Prices have become more cost 
related. Moreover, carriers' route structures are no 
longer restricted by the CAB. Instead, carriers engage in 
overall planning of their routes so as to use their 
resources most efficiently. They emphasize the 
development of hub-and-spoke operations at major 
airports.- Hub-and-spoke operations allow carriers to 
combine passengers with different origins and 
destinations, thus increase loads and reduce operating 
costs. Hub-and-spoke operations have intensified service 
competition in most markets nationwide (Slovin et al.
1991, 237). In addition, a number of carriers began to 
provide interstate air service after deregulation. These
^In a hub-and-spoke route network, flights from 
different origins arrive at an intermediate airport, and 
passengers will then change airplanes and go on to their 
final destinations.
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included former intrastate carriers and totally new 
carriers. Deregulation brought freedom in setting prices 
and establishing routes to airlines. But, it also 
intensified the competition and increased uncertainty in 
the operating environments for all carriers.
Natural Gas
The natural gas industry first became subject to 
federal regulations when Congress passed the Natural Gas 
Act in 1938. This legislation brought the interstate 
transmission of natural gas and its sale for resale under 
the control of the Federal Power Commission. In 1954 the 
Federal Power Commission's regulatory powers were extended 
to include prices charged by producers at wellheads by the 
Supreme Court's ruling in the Phillips Petroleum Company 
vs. Wisconsin case. However, natural gas sold in 
intrastate markets remained unregulated because the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Supreme Court decision 
applied only to natural gas sold in interstate markets 
(Chen and Sanger 1985, 38).
Before 1970, no shortages of natural gas were 
observed either in the interstate or intrastate markets. 
However, as the consumption of natural gas increased, 
prices of natural gas increased. Large price differences 
arose between the interstate and intrastate markets since 
natural gas sold within state lines was not subjected to 
price ceilings set by the Federal Power Commission. As a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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result of the natural gas shortages, some industries cut 
back production and many people lost their jobs. The 
situation worsened each year. The need for regulatory 
reform became clear. After more than a year of debate, 
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was passed. Under the 
Act, federal natural gas regulation was extended to gas 
sold in intrastate markets. Meanwhile, the Act partially 
deregulated the prices at which producers could sell 
natural gas to pipelines at wellheads. The majority of 
new gas (gas from wells drilled after February 19, 1977) 
were deregulated in January of 1985. One exception was 
that gas produced from "high cost" sources was deregulated 
on November 1, 1979. Old gas (gas from wells drilled on 
or before February 19, 1977) remained regulated 
indefinitely, but with price ceilings indexed to inflation 
(Chen and Sanger 1985, 39-40).
Natural gas markets had always been vulnerable to 
random shocks as a result of changes in weather, level of 
economic activities or prices of alternative fuels. But, 
during most of the 1970s, these shocks seldom translated 
into revenue risks for producers, pipelines and 
distributors because of price ceilings and excess demands. 
By eliminating wellhead price ceilings, the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978 increased the uncertainty faced by 
producers and pipelines. Wellhead price deregulation 
changed the way producers sold gas and the way pipelines
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bought gas. Prices were determined by market forces and 
therefore were subject to random shocks. Along with 
higher uncertainty, deregulation also created new 
opportunities. Producers could explore and develop 
resources that would not have been economic under pre­
deregulated price ceilings. On the other hand, pipelines 
could seek out new markets, as they are no longer 
restricted by inadequate supplies.
Trucking
Federal government control was extended to motor 
carriers in 1935 when the Motor Carrier Act was signed 
into law. Of the major provisions of the Act, those 
affecting entry had been most important in shaping the 
structure of the industry. The burden of proof was on 
applicants to show that their proposed services were or 
would be "required by the present or future public 
convenience and necessity" (Anderson and Huttsell 1989,
16). Therefore, it was difficult for motor carriers to 
extend their operations. Rates were also strictly 
controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
From the beginning, the economic regulation of motor 
carriers was criticized on the grounds that the industry 
was inherently competitive (Moore 1986, 17). In 1975, 
President Gerald Ford called for legislation to reduce 
trucking regulations, and with changes in the ICC 
membership, significant regulatory reform began in 1977
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Kahn 1979, 5). Entry and rate controls became less 
restrictive. By 1979, the ICC had almost totally 
deregulated the industry by substantially reinterpreting 
the law in the direction of reduced regulation (Moore 
1986, 21). Recognizing the uncertainty felt by the 
trucking industry. Congress concluded that the ICC should 
be given explicit direction for regulation of the trucking 
industry (Harper 1980, 7). On July 1, 1980, the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 was signed into law.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 substantially relaxed 
entry control in the trucking industry. Its most 
significant provision was to shift the burden of proof 
from the applicants to the protestors. In other words, an 
operating authority will be granted unless the protestors 
show that the proposed service will be inconsistent with 
the public convenience and necessity (Harper 1980, 9). In 
fact, of the 28,414 applications for new or expanded 
operating rights in 1981, the commission approved 97 
percent of them (Felton 1989, 145). In addition, many 
other operating restrictions were either eliminated or 
reduced.
The Act also relaxed rate regulations. It created a 
zone within which the ICC might "not investigate, suspend, 
revise or revoke any rate proposed by a motor carrier ... 
on the grounds that such rate is unreasonable" (Harper 
1980, 19). The zone of rate freedom was 10 percent above
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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or below the rate in effect one year prior to the proposed 
change. Furthermore, the Act restricted the activities of 
motor carrier rate bureaus, and in so doing reduced the 
effectiveness of these bureaus in controlling rate 
competition. Perhaps the best indicator of the impact of 
the regulatory reform on the trucking industry is the loss 
in the value of operating authorities. The average 
selling price of the authorities fell from over $350,000 
in 1978 to below $20,000 in 1981 (Moore 1986, 30). 
Regulatory reform in the trucking industry subjects these 
carriers to a more competitive and uncertain operating 
environment as the number of carriers increases and as 
carriers are granted additional operating authorities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Chapter two discusses literature relevant to the study. 
Chapter three describes the hypotheses and the methods 
used. Chapter four provides the empirical findings of the 
study, and chapter five contains a summary and concluding 
remarks.
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CHAPTER TWO 
RELEVANT RESEARCH
This chapter reviews the research literature relevant 
to this study. Section one reviews research on the 
associations of accounting earnings and stock returns. 
Section two reviews research on the effects of 
deregulation.
Associations of Accounting Earnings and Stock Returns 
The relationship between accounting earnings and 
stock returns has been one of the most researched areas in 
the recent accounting literature. Ball and Brown (1968) 
began this line of research by examining the associations 
between unexpected annual earnings and the 12-month 
abnormal returns covering the period before the earnings 
announcements. They find that firms with higher than 
expected earnings experienced positive abnormal returns 
and firms with lower than expected earnings experienced 
negative abnormal returns. Since then, numerous studies 
have extended Ball and Brown's study. The findings are 
generally consistent with the notion that the signs as 
well as the magnitudes of unexpected earnings are 
positively associated with abnormal returns. However, a 
simple regression of abnormal returns on unexpected 
earnings generally explains only a small portion of the
13
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variations of abnormal returns around earnings 
announcement dates. For example, Hagerman et al. (1984) 
regress five-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
quarterly earnings announcement dates on the proportional 
changes in the quarterly earnings per share, and the 
coefficient of determination (R̂ ) is only 5%. These 
authors suggest that the low explanatory power of the 
model indicates that factors other than the magnitude of 
unexpected earnings affect the stock price responses to 
earnings announcements.
The literature of identifying factors affecting stock 
price responses to earnings announcements can be divided 
into two main areas in terms of the theoretical frameworks 
on which the studies were based: (1) information economics 
based valuation models and (2) time-series based valuation 
models (see Cho and Jung 1991b for details).
Information Economics Based Valuation Models
The models developed by Choi (1985), Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) basically use the same 
form of information system. These models assume that the 
value (or the price) of a firm is a linear function of 
future cash flows (or dividends) which are normally 
distributed with mean f i and variance â . Earnings signals 
are assumed to communicate the true future cash flows (or 
dividends) perturbed by noise e . The random variable e is 
assumed to have a normal distribution with mean zero and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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variance 0̂ . The reciprocal of the variance, 1/0%, 
represents the quality of the earnings signal. Given this 
simplified setting, the price revision around earnings 
announcements (Ap) is given by:
Ap = [anV (aV+0^) ]*[y-E(y) ] (1)
where a>0 is a scale factor that converts cash flows (or 
dividends) to earnings, y is the reported earnings, and 
E(y) is the expected earnings. Scaling both sides of 
equation (1) by the price immediately prior to the 
earnings announcement indicates that the ratio aa^/(aV+0^) 
is the ERC. Differentiating the ERC with respect to 
(the prior uncertainty with respect to the firm's future 
cash flows or dividends) and 0̂  (the variance of the noise 
in the earnings signal) respectively implies that the ERC 
is positively related to and negatively related to 0̂ . 
The last relationship implies that the ERC is positively 
related to 1/0^ (the quality of the earnings signal).
Based on these results, empirical studies hypothesize 
that ERCs increase with the uncertainty about the firm's 
future cash flows and with the quality of the firm's 
reported earnings. Most of these studies examine the 
effect of a certain event in the informativeness of 
earnings as measured by ERCs.
Change in Uncertainty of Future Cash Flows
Cho and Jung (1991a) investigate the effects of a 
merger on the information content of earnings
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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announcements. They report a significant reduction in the 
information content after the merger for firms whose 
uncertainty about future earnings prospects is reduced by 
the merger.
Collins and DeAngelo (1990) examine the stock market 
reactions to earnings announcements of firms engaged in 
proxy contests. They argue that a proxy contest increases 
investor uncertainty about who would manage the firm in 
the future and hence about the firm's future cash flows. 
They find that ERCs significantly increase during a proxy 
contest and suggest that earnings released during a proxy 
contest are very useful in resolving investor uncertainty 
about the firm's future cash flows.
Change in Earnings Quality
Bandyopadhyay (1994) compares the ERCs of firms using 
the successful efforts accounting method and those using 
the full cost method. He argues that earnings quality of 
successful efforts firms is higher than that of full cost 
firms. However, the finding of his study is sensitive to 
time periods. Specifically, ERCs of firms using the 
successful efforts method, on average, exceed those of 
firms using the full cost method during 1982-1985 but not 
during 1986-1990.
Choi and Jeter (1992) examine the effects of 
qualified audit opinions on ERCs. They hypothesize that 
ERCs decrease in the post-qualification periods because a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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qualified audit opinion has the potential to adversely 
affect the stock market's perception of the quality of the 
earnings numbers generated by the firm. The results are 
consistent with their prediction that ERCs decline 
subsequent to the issuance of the qualified audit 
opinions. However, other firm characteristic changes such 
as the decrease in earnings persistence can also 
contribute to the observed results.
Collins and Salatka (1993) examine the effects of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.52 
on firms' earnings quality. They find that ERCs increased 
following the implementation of SFAS No.52 for those firms 
whose accounting for foreign currency gains and losses is 
most affected by the new standard. The results are 
interpreted to suggest that earnings produced under SFAS 
No.52 were perceived by stock market participants to be of 
higher quality than those produced under the old 
accounting standard.
Rao (1989) examines the intertemporal variation of 
ERCs following the firms' initial public offerings. She 
hypothesizes that ERCs increase over time following 
initial public offerings because of the improvement in the 
quality of the earnings signals. Consistent with her 
prediction, ERCs increase as the firms' stocks are 
seasoned.
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Time-Series Based Valuation Models 
Collins and Kothari (1989) start with an equity 
valuation model in which price is modeled as the 
discounted present value of future expected dividends, and 
they assume future expected dividends are related to
current earning as:
k—If 2, . . . ® (2)
where is the expectation at time t of dividends to
be received at the end of period t+k and is the firm's 
reported earnings for period t. Then, price is expressed 
as a function of earnings:
-  ' (3)
Jc=i
where E (R̂+j) is the expected rate of return from the end of 
period t+j-1 to the end of period t+j. Therefore, the 
unexpected return associated with unexpected earnings is 
derived as:
where UXt=Xt-E,.i (X̂ ) is the unexpected earnings in period t. 
Therefore, the ERG is a function of Â +̂ 's and the expected 
rate of return. Since expected rate of return is a 
positive function of systematic risk and the risk-free 
interest rate under the capital asset pricing model, 
Collins and Kothari (1989) conclude that the ERC is a 
decreasing function of systematic risk and risk-free 
interest rate. Furthermore, they argue that A,+k's are
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increasing functions of earnings persistence and growth 
opportunities; therefore, the ERC is positively related to 
the earnings persistence and growth opportunities.
Lang (1991) models the ERC as a positive function of
the level of uncertainty about the time-series process of
earnings. He derives the ERC using a model similar to 
Collins and Kothari (1989) but he assumes that earnings 
are equal to dividends, and that earnings follow a random
walk with drift time series process. Investors are
assumed to learn about the unknown drift parameter over 
time from the observed time series of earnings. As a 
result, the uncertainty about the firm's value decreases 
over time as a longer earnings series is available to 
estimate the unknown drift parameter. Predictions from 
Lang's model is that the ERC decreases over time following 
the date the firm begins trading publicly or following 
events (e.g., industry deregulation) which signal that the 
information in the past earnings series may not be 
relevant anymore in predicting future earnings.
Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Easton and Zmijewski 
(1989) also use time-series based valuation models to 
derive determinants of the ERC. The predictions from 
these studies are that the ERC is a positive function of 
earnings persistence and a negative function of systematic 
risk.
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Many empirical studies examine the hypothesized 
relationships between ERCs and the variables identified in 
these time-series based valuation models. The variables 
investigated include earnings persistence, systematic 
risk, risk-free interest rate, growth opportunities, 
uncertainty about the earnings process, and industry 
effects.
Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence measures the degree to which 
current period earnings shocks persist in the future. 
Earnings persistence is typically measured by estimating 
an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) time 
series earnings process. Studies consistently report that 
earnings persistence is significantly positively 
correlated with ERCs (Collins and Kothari 1989; Dhaliwal 
and Reynolds 1994; Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Kallapur 
1994; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Lipe 1990).
Teets (1992) differs from the previous studies in 
that he examines regulation as one possible economic 
determinant of earnings persistence. He finds that the 
average ERC of regulated electric utilities is 
significantly less than that of nonregulated firms. With 
the assumption of a positive relation between the ERC and 
persistence, he suggests that the result is consistent 
with the view that earnings persistence is lower for 
utilities than for nonregulated firms.
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Systematic Risk
Collins and Kothari (1989) and Lipe (1990) find 
evidence of a significant negative correlation between the 
ERC and systematic risk. However, Easton and Zmijewski 
(1989), Jeter and Chaney (1992), Ahmed (1994), and 
Kallapur (1994) do not find the negative correlation to be 
significant.
Risk-Free Interest Rate
Using yields on long-term U.S. Government bonds as a 
proxy for the risk-free interest rate, Collins and Kothari 
(1989) find significantly negative association between 
ERCs and risk-free interest rates.
Growth Opportunities
Using market-to-book equity ratios as the proxy, 
Collins and Kothari (1989) find growth opportunities to be 
positively associated with ERCs. However, Ahmed (1994), 
using a different proxy (the ratio of stock of research 
and development expenditures to replacement cost of 
property, plant, and equipment), find a negative 
association between ERCs and growth opportunities. 
Uncertainty About the Earnings Process
Lang (1991) examines how changes in the level of 
uncertainty about the time-series process of earnings 
affect ERCs. He compares ERCs over a 12-quarter period 
following initial public offerings. The results are 
consistent with the prediction of his model that ERCs
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decrease over time following the date the firm begins 
trading publicly.
Industry Effects
Biddle and Seow (1991) investigate the relationship 
between industry characteristics and ERCs based on the 
relationship between these characteristics and earnings 
persistence or systematic risk. They find significant 
positive correlation between ERCs and barriers-to-entry 
and significant negative correlation between ERCs and 
financial leverage.
Firm Size
In addition to the variables mentioned above, firm 
size is another widely tested variable in the 
earnings/return correlation literature. Freeman (1987) 
finds evidence consistent with an inverse relationship 
between ERCs and firm size. However, Dempsey (1989) finds 
that the firm size effect disappears with analyst 
following. In addition, Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and 
Ahmed (1994) also do not find ERCs to be significantly 
correlated with firm size.
Deregulation
Many sectors of the U.S. economy have experienced 
considerable deregulation during the late 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1977, 17 percent of the U.S. gross national product 
(GNP) was produced by industries which were fully 
regulated, and by 1988 that total was only 6.6 percent of
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GNP (Winston 1993, 1263). Industry deregulation subjects 
firms to a new operating environment. Some firms are more 
successful in adjusting to the new environment and in 
taking advantage of the new opportunities. Others may not 
be as fortunate and may be made worse off by deregulation. 
However, Winston (1993, 1284) argues that the overall 
welfare effect of deregulation on society is significantly 
positive (his estimate of the gains is about $40 billion 
annually).
With regard to the effects of deregulation on firm 
risk, there are two different views. Following the 
arguments of Peltzman (197 6 ) regarding regulation, one 
view suggests that deregulation increases the impact of 
demand and cost shocks on the industry, and thus increases 
the variability of profits and the risk of the affected 
firms. On the other hand, Joskow and MacAvoy (1975) 
assert that regulators are slow to act in response to cost 
and demand shocks, so that nonregulated firms react to 
these shocks more quickly; thus, they argue that 
deregulation reduces rather than increases the risk of the 
affected firms.
A number of studies have examined empirically the 
impact of deregulation on the risk of the deregulated 
firms. Bundt et al. (1992) examine the effects of the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980 on the market risk of the U.S. banking
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industry. The estimated average change in systematic risk 
associated with deregulation for the portfolio of 27 bank 
holding companies is positive and significant.
Furthermore, nonsystematic risk is also found to have 
increased after deregulation.
Chen and Sanger (1985) examine the impact of the 
deregulation of the U.S. natural gas industry provided by 
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. They find significant 
increases in the systematic risks of natural gas 
producers, distributors, and firms in some natural gas 
related industries (bituminous coal mining and machinery 
industries) around the time of passage of the Act. In 
addition, Fraser and Kannan (1990) and Pettway et al.
(1988) also find empirical evidence of increases in 
systematic risk associated with deregulation.
On the other hand, Cunningham et al. (1988) analyze 
the impact of deregulation of the U.S. airlines industry 
in 1978, and find that systematic risk of airlines 
increased in the period (of about one year) immediately 
after deregulation. But the increase was temporary, and 
it was followed by a period in which systematic risk fell 
to a level below or about equal to that in the regulated 
period.
Summary
Chapter two discusses research relevant to this 
study. Research on the associations of accounting
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earnings and stock returns is reviewed. Studies 
identifying factors affecting stock price responses to 
earnings announcements and the two theoretical frameworks 
on which these studies are based are discussed. The two 
theoretical frameworks are the information economics based 
valuation models developed by Choi (1985), Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) and the time-series 
based valuation models developed by Collins and Kothari
(1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Kormendi and Lipe 
(1987), and Lang (1989). Many empirical studies examine 
the hypothesized relationships between ERCs and variables 
identified in these models. The findings of these studies 
are generally consistent with the predictions that ERCs 
are positively related to the uncertainty about future 
cash flows and earnings persistence and negatively related 
to the quality of the earnings signal. However, empirical 
evidence of the effects of other variables (including 
systematic risk, risk-free interest rate, growth 
opportunities, uncertainty about the earnings process, 
barriers-to-entry, financial leverage, and firm size) on 
ERCs is either mixed or sparse. The chapter concludes 
with a review of the research on the effects of 
deregulation. A number of studies find empirical evidence 
of increases in systematic risk associated with 
deregulation. However, Cunningham et al. (1988) find that 
for the airline industry the increase in systematic risk
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was temporary, and it was followed by a period in which 
systematic risk fell to a level below or about equal to 
that in the regulated period.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHOD
This chapter discusses the research methodology used 
in this study. Section one discusses the research 
hypotheses. Data sources are described in section two.
The final section describes the statistical procedures 
used to test the research hypotheses.
Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One 
Peltzman (1976) argues that the presence of 
regulation reduces the impact of demand and cost shocks on 
the industry. His argument is that if costs rise, 
regulators will allow the firm to increase prices so that 
profits are not affected, and on the other hand, if costs 
fall, regulators will ask the firm to reduce prices so 
that the firm does not earn too much profit. The results 
are that earnings of regulated firms will not fluctuate 
too much, and thus the level of uncertainty of regulated 
firms' future earnings or cash flows is relatively low. 
However, with the deregulation of the industry, protection 
given by the regulators ceases to exist. Some firms may 
be able to take advantage of the opportunity created by 
deregulation. Others may not be able to adjust to the new 
environment quickly. Thus, deregulation increases the
27
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level of uncertainty of the deregulated firms' future 
earnings or of the firms' future cash flows.
The theoretical models of Choi (1985) ,  Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) suggest that stock price 
responses to value-relevant information are a function of:
(1 ) the uncertainty in the firms' value-relevant cash 
flows and (2 ) the variance of the noise in the information 
signal. In particular, as related to this study, the 
implications of these models are that ERCs are positively 
related to uncertainty associated with the future cash 
flows and negatively related to the variance of the noise 
in the earnings signals. As suggested by Jeter and Chaney 
(1992, 841), intuitively, these relationships are expected 
because information from earnings announcements could 
resolve more uncertainty for firms with greater 
uncertainty, and the stock market participants will rely 
less on earnings signals if the signals are perceived to 
be noisier and thus less dependable. Deregulation leads 
to a higher level of uncertainty, but deregulation is not 
expected to lead to noisier earnings signals. Therefore, 
larger ERCs are expected after deregulation. In addition, 
Teets (1992) finds that the ERCs of electric utilities are 
significantly less than those of nonregulated firms. This 
result suggests that ERCs of regulated firms are smaller 
than those of nonregulated firms and that ERCs should thus 
be larger after deregulation.
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On the other hand, deregulation substantially reduces 
industry barriers to entry, and Biddle and Seow (1991) 
provide evidence that ERCs are positively correlated with 
these same barriers. Moreover, results of prior research 
suggest that the risk of firms experiencing deregulation 
could increase. Collins and Kothari (1989) and Lipe
(1990) find that ERCs vary negatively with the systematic 
risk of the firms (though, Easton and Zmijewski 1989, 
among others find the relationship to be insignificant). 
These results suggest that ERCs could decline after 
deregulation. However, the results in Teets (1992) 
suggest that these two factors (barriers to entry and firm 
risk) are not dominant factors. Teets finds that the ERCs 
of electric utilities are significantly less than those of 
nonregulated firms but one would probably expect that the 
barriers to entry are higher in the electric utility 
industry than those in nonregulated industries. Moreover, 
Teets finds that electric utilities have lower systematic 
risk than nonregulated firms, but the ERCs of electric 
utilities are significantly less than those of 
nonregulated firms. Therefore, it is expected that the 
uncertainty factor will dominate, and that larger ERCs are 
expected after deregulation. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H[ : Earnings response coefficients are larger after
deregulation than before deregulation.
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Hypothesis Two 
Lang (1991) suggests that the magnitude of the stock 
price responses to earnings is a function of the degree of 
uncertainty about the time series parameters of earnings. 
He presents a model in which future earnings are estimated 
by investors from the observed time series of earnings.
The implication of his model is that when investors are 
less certain about the time series parameters of earnings, 
ERCs will be relatively larger. Over time, as the 
uncertainty is resolved, ERCs will decrease toward a 
positive lower bound. Lang (1991) provides empirical 
evidence that ERCs decrease over time, following the date 
firms begin trading publicly.
Deregulation subjects firms to a relatively new 
operating environment. Earnings numbers before 
deregulation will not necessarily reflect what can be 
expected following deregulation. Thus, after 
deregulation, as in the case of initial public offerings, 
uncertainty about the future prospects for the firm will 
be relatively high. As a longer series of earnings 
numbers after deregulation becomes available, uncertainty 
decreases and the magnitude of the stock price responses 
to earnings decreases.
Rao (1989) also examines the intertemporal variation 
of ERCs following initial public offerings, but she uses 
annual earnings announcements and investigates annual ERCs
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(i.e., slope coefficients from regressions of annual stock 
returns on annual unexpected earnings). Rao's results 
differ from those of Lang (1991). Specifically, Rao finds 
that as firms' stocks are seasoned, the annual ERCs 
increase. Rao's basic premise is that the quality of the 
earnings signals improve over time following initial 
public offerings. However, these results are not expected 
in this study for three reasons. First, this study 
considers quarterly earnings announcements (as does Lang), 
and as suggested by Lang (1991, 230), perhaps the pattern 
of decreasing ERCs is most pronounced over the first 
several quarters following events that substantially 
increase the uncertainty level. Thus, it will be 
difficult to detect this pattern using annual earnings 
announcements. Second, this study examines stock market 
responses to earnings announcements over only a two-day 
period, whereas Rao examines stock market responses over a 
12-month period. Third, as suggested previously, 
deregulation is not expected to change the quality of the 
earnings signals. As a result, it is expected that the 
uncertainty factor will dominate, and that the magnitude 
of the stock price responses to earnings will decrease 
over time following deregulation. This leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H,: Following deregulation, earnings response
coefficients decrease over time.
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Hypothesis Three
This study examines deregulation in three industries: 
airline, natural gas, and trucking. The scope and extent 
of deregulation vary for these three industries. The 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 essentially eliminated 
all economic regulations on airlines. The Act ended the 
CAB'S authority over routes on December 31, 1981, and its 
authority over airfares on January 1, 1983. The Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 substantially relaxed entry and rate 
regulations in the trucking industry. However, the Act 
fell short of the kind of deregulation prescribed in the 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Specifically, the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 did not eliminate entry and rate 
regulations; it just substantially relaxed them. Finally, 
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 only partially 
deregulated the price of natural gas charged by producers.
The increase in the uncertainty about a firm's future 
cash flows due to deregulation should depend on the scope 
and extent of deregulation. Intuitively, the full-scale 
deregulation in the airline industry should lead to a 
larger increase in uncertainty than the substantial 
relaxation of regulations in the trucking industry. The 
latter, in turn, should lead to a larger increase in 
uncertainty than the gradual and partial deregulation in 
the natural gas industry. However, factors other than the 
scope and extent of deregulation can also affect the
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magnitude of the increases in the uncertainty induced by
deregulation. One such factor is the ability of
deregulated firms to cope with the changes in their
operating environment. For example, in the natural gas
industry long term contracts between producers and
pipelines are quite common. Bound by contracts signed in
the pre-deregulation era, these producers and pipelines
cannot respond quickly to changes in the operating
environment induced by deregulation. Furthermore,
relatively limited mobility of the operating assets of
these firms can also hinder the adjustments to the new
operating environment. On the other hand, airlines can
adjust the prices they charge and the routes they serve
relatively easily. Therefore, it is unclear what the
order of the magnitude of the increases in uncertainty and
thus the order of the magnitude of the increase in ERCs
is. This issue is examined empirically by testing the
following hypothesis (stated in alternative form):
H): The increases in the earnings response
coefficients due to deregulation of firms in the 
airline, natural gas, and trucking industries 
are not the same.
Sample Selection 
This study attempts to determine the impact of 
deregulation on ERCs. Three industries (airline, natural 
gas, and trucking) that were deregulated in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s are examined. The laws that deregulated
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these industries are the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and the Motor Carrier 
Act of 1980. As the Natural Gas Policy Act deregulated 
only the prices at which producers could sell natural gas 
to pipelines at wellheads, only firms engaged in the 
exploration, production or transmission of natural gas are 
examined in this study. In other words, firms engaged 
primarily in petroleum exploration and production or in 
natural gas distribution are excluded from this study. 
Firms included in the study must meet the following 
criteria: (1 ) the firm must be in the airline, natural gas 
exploration, production or transmission, or trucking 
industries; (2) the firm must be followed by the Value 
Line Investment Survey (Value Line) and must have Value 
Line's actual and forecast quarterly earnings per share;
(3) earnings announcement dates of the firm must be 
available from the Wall Street Journal Index or the 
Standard and Poor's Compustat; (4) the firm must have 
daily return data on the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) daily return tapes; (5) the firm must have 
at least 32 usable observations over the study's testing 
periods^; and (6 ) the firm must not have its earnings 
announcement dates and the immediately preceding trading 
dates coincide with the dates of deregulation. This last
^The testing periods used in the study are discussed 
in detail later in the chapter.
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criterion is included to ensure that earnings 
announcements can be classified as those in pre- or post­
deregulation periods.
Value Line, Standard and Poor's Register of 
Corporations, Directors and Executives, and Moody's 
Industrial Manual are consulted to determine a firm's 
membership in a certain industry. Earnings announcement 
dates are taken primarily from the Wall Street Journal 
Index. For those which are not available from the Wall 
Street Journal Index, Compustat are used. Return data are 
taken from the CRSP daily return tapes.
Value Line's most recent forecasts of quarterly 
earnings per share are used as a proxy for the market's 
earnings expectation. Earnings forecasts are adjusted for 
any stock splits and stock dividends that occurred between 
the earnings forecast dates and the earnings announcement 
dates. The choice of Value Line analysts' forecasts as 
the proxy for the market's expectation of earnings is 
supported by the evidence reported by Leftwich and 
Zmijewski (1994) and Philbrick and Ricks (1991). Leftwich 
and Zmijewski find that Value Line forecast errors are 
more highly correlated with the 3-day abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements than are the seasonal random 
walk forecast errors and the random walk forecast errors. 
Meanwhile, Philbrick and Ricks compare the associations of 
seven forecast error metrics (using combinations of Value
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Line and Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) 
forecasts and Value Line. IBES, and Compustat actual 
earnings) with the 3-day abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements. They find that the strongest associations 
are obtained with the use of Value Line actual earnings 
and either Value Line or IBES forecast data.
Statistical Procedures 
Regression Model
The following regression model (denoted as the full 
model) is estimated for firms in the sample to test the 
hypothesized effects of deregulation on ERCs:
CARjq = ao+a,D,„+a2ÜE,-,+a3ÜEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*Di„* ( 1/T,,) +a;RVL;q+agUE;q*PERjq 
+a7ÜEi,* INT;,+agUEi,*BETAi,+Ui, ( 5 )
where
CARjq = cumulative abnormal returns over day 0 and day
- 1  relative to the earnings announcement date of 
firm i in quarter q.
Djq = 1 if quarter q is in the post-deregulation
period.
= 0 if quarter q is in the pre-deregulation
period.
UEjq = (Value Line ' s actual earnings per share minus
Value Line's most recent earnings per share 
forecast) divided by share price two days before 
earnings announcement date of firm i in quarter
q-Tjq = 1 if quarter q is in the pre-deregulation
period.
= the number of quarters since deregulation for
quarters in the post-deregulation period.
RVLjq = cumulative abnormal return from the most recent
Value Line's earnings forecast date through 2 
days prior to the earnings announcement date of 
firm i in quarter q.
PERjq = earnings persistence for firm i in quarter q,
measured as the time-series parameter in the 
Foster (1977) model.
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BETAjq= beta estimated from the market model for firm i
in quarter q.
INT^ = yield of long term U,S, Government bonds in the
month of the earnings announcement of firm i in
quarter q.
Ujq = random disturbance term.
CARjq is computed as:
j— 1
(6)
where R,̂  is the actual daily return of firm i on day j and 
ERjqj is the expected return of firm i on day j. Expected 
returns are estimated using the market model:
= Gi + + ©it (7)
where
Rji = return of firm i on day t;
= return of the CRSP equally-weighted market
portfolio on day t;
Oji = random disturbance term.
The market model is estimated using a 200-day trading 
period prior to the day before each quarterly earnings 
announcement, excluding the day prior to and the day of 
any quarterly earnings announcements of the firm. ER^ is 
then calculated as û!i+/3i*R„j where C; and j8; are parameters 
estimated from the above regression, and R̂ j is the actual 
return of the CRSP equally-weighted market portfolio on 
day j. A second method of estimating expected returns is 
also used. In this method, the expected return is the 
equally-weighted return on the market value portfolio of 
which the firm is a member. Market value portfolios are 
constructed by the CRSP every year according to the firm's
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market capitalization at previous year-end. There are ten 
portfolios each containing approximately the same number 
of firms. This second method is intended to control for 
the widely documented firm size effect (Kothari and Wasley 
1989) . Since the tenor of the results of the study is not 
sensitive to the estimation method of expected returns, 
only results using the market model method are reported.
Unexpected earnings (UE^), defined as Value Line's 
actual earnings minus Value Line's most recent earnings 
forecasts, are deflated by stock price. The theoretical 
models of Choi (1985), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988), 
and Lev (1989) suggest that unexpected earnings should be 
deflated by stock price. Furthermore, Christie (1987) 
also argues that stock price is the correct deflator if 
the dependent variable is stock return.
The term l/T,, is included in the regression to model 
for the hypothesized pattern of ERCs (i.e., decreasing 
over time) after deregulation. This functional form is 
also used by Lang (1991). An alternative way, discussed 
later in the chapter, of modelling the hypothesized 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation is 
also used.
Value Line's earnings forecasts are used as a proxy 
for the market's expectation of earnings immediately 
before earnings announcements. However, Value Line's 
earnings forecasts are made before actual announcement
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dates."* In order to mitigate the measurement error in 
expected earnings arising from stale forecasts, RVLj, is 
included in the regression model (see Easton and Zmijewski 
1989 for the rationale in including this variable).
A number of variables, which have been documented to 
be determinants of ERCs, are included in the regression 
model to control for the effects of these variables.* 
Collins and Kothari (1989), Easton and Zmijewski (1989), 
among others have documented that ERCs are positively 
related to earnings persistence. In this study, earnings 
persistence (PER,,) is measured as the time-series 
parameter in the Foster (1977) model. For each firm- 
guarter in the sample, earnings persistence is estimated 
using the six most recent actual quarterly earnings and 
all the available Value Line's quarterly earnings 
forecasts. Collins and Kothari (1989) find a negative 
correlation between the ERC and the risk-free interest 
rate. As in Collins and Kothari (1989), the yields of 
long term U.S. Government bonds are used as a proxy for 
the risk-free interest rate (INT^). The evidence of the
■*Over the periods investigated in this study. Value 
Line's earnings forecasts were made, on average, 18 
trading days prior to the earnings announcement dates for 
the sample firms.
^Regression models with an additional control 
variable, financial leverage, which is defined as long­
term debt divided by market value of equity, are also 
employed. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
estimated without this variable.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
effects of beta on ERCs is mixed. Collins and Kothari
(1989) and Lipe (1990) find evidence of a significant 
negative association between ERCs and beta. However, 
Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and Ahmed (1994) do not find 
the negative correlation to be consistently significant. 
Beta (BETAjq) is the parameter estimate of the slope 
coefficient in the market model (see equation 7).
All control variables (i.e., earnings persistence, 
interest rate, and beta) enter the model interactively 
with unexpected earnings so that the coefficients (a*, a?, 
ag) represent the average change in ERCs per unit change in 
these variables.® Multicollinearity is a potential data 
problem since interaction terms are included in the 
regression models. To mitigate the multicollinearity 
problem, the following alternative model specification 
(denoted as the mean adjusted model) is also used’’*:
CAR;, =  ao+a,D,.,+a2UE,,+a3UE,„*Di,+a4UE,-,*Di,*(l/Ti,)+a5RVLi,
+a«UE;q* (PERj,-MPERi) +a7ÜE,„* (IN T ,,-M IN T i)
+agUEiq* ( BETAi,-MBETAi) +0,-̂  ( 8 )
®This approach is consistent with Freeman and Tse 
(1992, 203), Teoh and Wong (1993, 355), and Bandyopadhyay 
(1994, 667).
’it can be noted from the results presented in next 
chapter that this model specification greatly mitigates 
the multicollinearity problem.
*First differencing instead of mean adjusting of the 
control variables is also employed. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those of the mean adjusted 
models.
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where MPER^, MINT;, and MBETA; are the means of earnings 
persistence, interest rate, and beta respectively of firm 
i over the sample period. Definitions of all other terms 
in this model are the same as those in equation (5). In 
this model specification the coefficients â , a?, and a, 
represent the average change in ERCs per unit deviation 
from the firm-specific means of these control variables. 
Furthermore, in order to determine the effects of these 
control variables on the findings of the study, regression 
models without these control variables are also employed.
In other words, the following regression model (denoted as 
the reduced model) is also estimated for firms in the 
sample:
CARiq = ao+a,Di,+a2UE,-q+a3ÜEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*Di,* ( l/T,,) +a5RVLi,+U,., ( 9 )
Definitions of all the terms in this model are the same as 
those in equation (5).
In addition to using a reciprocal function to model 
the intertemporal variation of ERCs after deregulation, a 
dummy variable (Eĵ) with a value of one for the first ten 
quarters in the post-deregulation period and a value of 
zero otherwise is also employed. Therefore, the following 
regression and its corresponding mean adjusted and reduced 
models are also estimated:
CARjq =  ao+aiDi,+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UE;,*Diq*Eiq+ajRVLi,+a6UEiq*PERiq
fa^UEj/INTiq+agUEi/Betaiq+Uiq ( 10 )
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Definitions of all terms except E;, in this model are the 
same as those in equation (5). This model specification 
represents a more general test for the evidence of 
decreasing ERCs over time without the restriction of a 
reciprocal functional form.
In the regression models represented by equations 
(5), (7), or (8 ), the ERC before deregulation (0^=0) is â
and the ERC after deregulation (D,,,=l) is a2+&3+&4 (l/Tk,) 
after controlling for the covariates. For the alternative 
specification models where E^ is used, the ERC after 
deregulation is az+â +â  for the first ten quarters and is 
a,+a3 for the next ten quarters after controlling for the 
covariates. Positive values of â +â  are consistent under 
both model specifications with the prediction that ERCs 
after deregulation are greater than ERCs before 
deregulation. Positive values of â  are consistent with 
the prediction that ERCs decline over time following 
deregulation, after controlling for the covariates.
The research hypotheses in this study are tested 
using both pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions 
and firm-specific time-series regressions. When pooled 
time-series cross-sectional regressions are used, 
hypothesis one is tested by determining whether the 
parameter estimate of â +â  is significantly positive. 
Hypothesis two is tested by determining whether the 
parameter estimate of a< is significantly positive.
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Finally, hypothesis three is tested by comparing the 
parameter estimate of â +a,. in one industry with that in 
another industry.
When firm-specific time-series regressions are 
estimated separately for each firm in the sample, the 
significance of the parameter estimates of a^+a^'s and a*'s 
is tested on an aggregate basis by using the following 
z-statistic:
ti
where
tj = the t-statistic for firm i associated with the
estimate of the parameter 
kj = the degree of freedom in firm i's regression
n = the number of firms in the sample.
Under the Central Limit Theorem and under the null
hypothesis that the parameter equals zero, the
distribution of the z-statistic is standard normal (see
Christie 1990 for a detailed discussion of the test). In
using this test, it is assumed that the parameter
estimates are independent across the firms in the sample.
To investigate cross-sectional dependence, pairwise
correlations of the residuals from the firm-specific
regressions are estimated since cross-sectional
correlation of the residuals across equations is a
necessary condition for cross-sectional correlation of the
parameter estimates (Theil 1971). The mean correlation
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coefficients are positive and at most 0.05 for all the 
samples and model specifications investigated in this 
study. Thus, no strong evidence of cross-sectional 
dependence is found.
Hypothesis one is tested by determining whether the 
z-statistic calculated by aggregating the parameter 
estimates of â +â  is significantly positive. Similarly, 
hypothesis two is tested by determining whether the 
corresponding z-statistic calculated for â  is 
significantly positive. Finally, hypothesis three is 
tested by comparing the z-statistic of the parameter 
estimates of â +â  of one industry with the corresponding 
z-statistic of another industry.
Estimation Period
When available, 40 time series observations (20 
observations each for the pre- and post-deregulation 
periods) are used in the analysis. To be retained in the 
sample, firms must have at least 32 usable observations. 
The decision to use this number of observations in the 
time series is arbitrary. This choice of the length of 
the time series represents a compromise. On one hand, the 
time series has to be long enough to permit a reliable 
test of the research hypotheses. On the other hand, as 
the time series becomes longer, the assumption of 
intertemporal stability of the parameters becomes less 
reasonable.
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As mentioned previously, the Airline Deregulation Act 
of 1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, and the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980 are the laws which deregulated these 
industries. However, the date the stock market 
incorporated the effects of deregulation may not be the 
date the acts were signed into law or the date the acts 
became effective. Furthermore, there could be a period of 
transition to deregulation. A transition period is a 
period over which the industry is not in the pre­
deregulation era nor in the post-deregulation era. The 
determinations of deregulation dates and transition 
periods are done subjectively after reviewing legislative 
history and prior studies of deregulation in these three 
industries.
The airline industry was deregulated when the 
Airlines Deregulation Act was passed on October 24, 1978. 
However, the CAB had already started toward a more 
flexible regulatory regime before the passage of the Act. 
Debate on regulatory reform stemmed from the poor profit 
performance of airlines coupled with substantial fare 
increases in the early 1970s. Questions about the CAB's 
regulatory policies were growing. In July 1975, a special 
CAB task-force report recommended legislative reform. 
Meanwhile, a report by the Senate Aviation Committee 
concluded that increased competition was warranted. 
Thereafter, the CAB began to adopt a more liberal
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regulatory policies. The first significant step to 
deregulation was the approval of the advance booking 
charters on October 7, 1976 (Kaplan 1986, 44). Unlike 
earlier charters, which usually required membership in 
specific clubs or other restrictions, the advance booking 
charters required only advance-purchase and minimum-stay 
requirements. Recognizing the increased threat of 
competition from charters, scheduled carriers such as 
American Airlines applied for authority to offer 
substantial discount fares. The CAB routinely approved 
these requests of discount fares (Kaplan 1986, 44). At 
the same time, the CAB also took steps to give airlines 
greater discretion to determine the routes they served 
(Kaplan 1986, 45). These more liberal regulatory policies 
were eventually ratified by the passage of the Airline 
Deregulation Act in October 1978. The Act instructed the 
CAB to place reliance on competition in the regulation of 
airlines and ended the CAB's authority over routes on 
December 31, 1981, and the CAB's authority over fares on 
January 1, 1983. However, for the most part, the CAB's 
regulation on fares and routes ended sooner than mandated 
by the Act (Kaplan 1986, 47). To increase the pricing 
flexibility, the CAB, on May 14, 1980, allowed airlines to 
raise their fares ranging from 30% up to an unlimited 
amount, depending on the length of the routes involved.
This essentially ended the CAB's regulation on airfares
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(Kaplan 1986, 47). The end to route regulation came even 
sooner. Under the provisions of the Airline Deregulation 
Act, airlines could enter one market each year without 
formal CAB approval. In addition, the burden of proof in 
route cases were shifted from the potential entrant to the 
incumbent. In summary, the first significant step to 
airline deregulation was taken on October 7, 1976 and the 
CAB's regulation on airfares and routes essentially ended 
on May 14, 1980. Therefore, the period before October 7, 
1976 is considered as the regulated period while the 
period after May 14, 1980 is considered as the deregulated 
period. The period in between these two dates is 
considered as the transition period.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was passed on July 1, 
1980. While some loosening of trucking regulation can be 
traced back to 1975, major regulatory reform began in 1977 
after Daniel O'Neal was appointed as the Chairman of the 
ICC (Kahn 1979, 5). A major step toward deregulation was 
taken when the ICC revised the procedures for applying for 
motor carrier operating authority on December 9, 1977 
(Kahn 1979, 7). The revised procedures made it much 
easier to obtain the necessary authority to engage in 
motor carrier operations. Thereafter, the ICC continued 
to loosen its controls on the operations of trucking 
firms. By 1979 the ICC had almost totally deregulated the 
industry by substantially reinterpreting the law in the
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direction of reduced regulation (Moore 1986, 21). The 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 basically ratified the liberal 
regulatory policies of the ICC and provided an explicit 
direction for the deregulation efforts in the trucking 
industry (Harper 1980, 7). The ICC began implementing the 
law immediately after the Act was signed (Moore 1986, 21). 
Therefore, the period before December 9, 1977 is 
considered as the regulated period while the period after 
July 1, 1980 is considered as the deregulated period. The 
period in between these two dates is considered as the 
transition period.
The Natural Gas Policy Act was passed into law on 
November 10, 1978. Unlike the cases of airline and 
trucking deregulation, there was no loosening up of 
regulation in the natural gas industry before the passage 
of the deregulation law. Although the law was debated for 
over a year, the passage of the law was never assured 
until very close to the time that it was finally passed. 
Thus, the period before November 10, 1978 is considered as 
the regulated period. Under the provisions of the Natural 
Gas Policy Act, the prices of the majority of the gas 
deregulated by the Act became decontrolled on January 1, 
1985. In the interim, the price ceilings were indexed to 
inflation. Therefore, the period after January 1, 1985 is 
considered as the deregulated period, and the period
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between November 10, 1978 and January 1, 1985 is 
considered as the transition period.
Summary
Chapter three discusses the research methods used to 
answer the research question: How does deregulation affect 
ERGS? Three research hypotheses are developed: (1) ERCs 
are larger after deregulation than before deregulation;
(2) ERCs decline over time following deregulation; and (3) 
the increases in ERCs due to deregulation of firms in the 
three industries examined are not the same. Sample firms 
are obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey. 
Regression models are then developed to test the research 
hypotheses. Both pooled time-series cross-sectional and 
firm-specific time-series regression models are used. 
Variables found to be determinants of ERCs in previous 
research are included in some of the regression models to 
control for the effects of these variables on ERCs.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS
This chapter reports the analyses and results of the 
study. The first section presents the sample selection. 
The second section reports the results of the tests of 
research hypotheses.
Sample Selection 
As indicated in chapter three, firms included in this 
study must meet the following criteria: (1 ) the firm must 
be in the airline, natural gas exploration, production or 
transmission, or trucking industries; (2 ) the firm must be 
followed by the Value Line and must have Value Line's 
actual and forecast quarterly earnings per share; (3) 
earnings announcement dates of the firm must be available 
from the Wall Street Journal Index or the Standard and 
Poor's Compustat; (4) the firm must have daily return data 
on the CRSP daily return tapes; (5) the firm must have at 
least 32 usable observations over the study's testing 
periods; and (6 ) the firm must not have its earnings 
announcement dates and the immediately preceding trading 
dates coincide with the dates of deregulation.
Application of these selection criteria resulted in a 
sample of 35 firms listed in table 1. Nine of the sample
50
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Table 1 
List of Sample Firms
Company Name eusIP number Industry
1. American 001765 Airlines
2. Delta 247361 Airlines
3. Eastern 276191 Airlines
4. Northwest 62945J Airlines
5. Pan Am 697757 Airlines
6 . PSA 693624 Airlines
7. TWA 893349 Airlines
8. United 902549 Airlines
9. Western 957586 Airlines
10. Apache 037411 Natural Gas
11. Arkla 041237 Natural Gas
12. Coastal 190441 Natural Gas
13. Columbia Gas 197648 Natural Gas
14. Consolidated Nat. Gas 209615 Natural Gas
15. Enron 293561 Natural Gas
16. Equitable Resource 294549 Natural Gas
17. Helmerich & Payne 423452 Natural Gas
18. Kerr-McGee 492386 Natural Gas
19. KN Energy 482620 Natural Gas
20. Louisiana Land & Expl. 546268 Natural Gas
21. Mesa 590655 Natural Gas
22. Panhandle Eastern 698462 Natural Gas
23. Tenneco 880370 Natural Gas
24. Texas Eastern 882387 Natural Gas
25. Transco Energy 893532 Natural Gas
26. Arkansas Best 040789 Trucking
27. CLC of America 125615 Trucking
28. Consolidated Freight 209237 Trucking
29. Flexi-Van 339376 Trucking
3 0. Leaseway Transp. 522066 Trucking
31. Overnite Transp. 690326 Trucking
32. Ryder Systems 783549 Trucking
33. Transway International 894015 Trucking
3 4. Xtra 984138 Trucking
35. Yellow Freight 985509 Trucking
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firms are airlines, sixteen are natural gas firms, and the 
remaining ten are trucking firms.
Table 2 reports the pre- and post-deregulation sample 
means of the variables used in the regression models for 
the full sample and samples disaggregated by industry. It 
can be noted that no significant differences emerged 
between the pre- and post-deregulation periods in abnormal 
returns around earnings announcement dates or abnormal 
returns from earnings forecast dates through two days 
prior to the earnings announcement dates for any of the 
samples. Unexpected earnings are negative for both the 
full sample and samples disaggregated by industry in both 
pre- and post-deregulation periods.* This is consistent 
with extant empirical evidence (e.g., Lys and Sohn 1990; 
O'Brien 1988) that financial analysts in general are, on 
average, optimistic in their earnings forecasts. For 
natural gas firms unexpected earnings become significantly 
more negative in the post-deregulation period. However, 
this is due to the fact that the magnitude of unexpected 
earnings are relatively very small prior to deregulation 
for these firms. In spite of the evidence of optimism. 
Value Line analysts' forecasts are used as the proxy for 
the market's earnings expectation because of the strong
^Recalled that unexpected earnings are defined as 
actual earnings minus forecast earnings scaled by stock 
price.
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Table 2
Samüle Means of Variables Used in the Regressions
Pre- Post­
deregulation deregulation
mean mean
Abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
Unexpected earnings 
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
0.00146
0.00028
-0.00018
0.00549
-0.00342 
-0. 00712 
-0.00054 
-0.00479
RVL=
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
Earnings persistence 
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
Interest rate
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
Beta
Full sample 
Airline 
Natural gas 
Trucking
-0.00264
0.00857
-0.00829
•0.00383
0.16937
0.26038
0.11663
0.17180
0.07818
0.07345
0.08090
0.07811
1.27581
1.69516
0.99262
1.35744
-0.00184 
-0.00407 
—0.00450 
0.00428
-0.00411
-0.00596
-0.00315
■0.00401
0.00128
0.00864
0.00146
-0.00539
0.17461
0.14546
0.17489
0.19953
0.10851
0.12334
0.09098
0.12331
1.10350
1.50013
0.96424
0.97846
T«
1.47
0.79
1.66
0.26
0.27
-0.13
2 .7 4 b
-0.18
-0.89
- 0.01
-1.60
0.18
- 0.20 
2 .5 9 b 
-1.50 
—0.54
-38.60b 
-46.40b 
-15.0 3 b
-5 4 .7 3 b
6 .1 3 b
5 .6 5 b
0.80
6.70b
'T-statistic for testing equality of means between the pre- 
and post-deregulation periods, 
bgignificant at p < 0.05.
'Cumulative abnormal return from the earnings forecast date 
through two days prior to the earnings announcement date.
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association between stock market responses to earnings and 
forecast errors based on Value Line analysts' forecasts 
reported in Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994) and Philbrick 
and Ricks (1991). Furthermore, the accuracy 
characteristics of Value Line analysts' forecasts are 
similar to those of other databases such as IBES and the 
Standard Poor's Earnings Forecaster (Philbrick and Ricks 
1991)
Earnings persistence declined significantly from the 
pre-deregulation to the post-deregulation period for 
airlines, but not for natural gas or trucking firms. 
Interest rates increased significantly from the pre­
deregulation to the post-deregulation period for all 
sample firms. This reflects that interest rates in the 
1980s were generally higher than those in the 1970s. A 
number of studies (e.g., Bundt et al. 1992; Chen and 
Sanger 1985) find that deregulation increases the beta 
values of deregulated firms. However, in this study 
sample firms in airline and trucking industries 
experienced a significant reduction in beta from the pre­
deregulation to the post-deregulation period, while 
natural gas firms did not experience a significant change 
in beta. One possible reason for the differences in the 
findings of this study from those of the two 
aforementioned studies is that there is a transition 
period between pre- and post-deregulation periods in this
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study. Furthermore, the findings in this study are 
consistent with those in Cunningham et al. (1988) who find 
that beta increased for the period immediately after the 
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, but beta 
fell to a level below or about equal to that in the 
regulated period two years after the Act was passed.
Results of the Tests of Hypotheses 
This section presents the results of the analyses of 
the research hypotheses. Both pooled time-series cross- 
sectional and firm-specific time-series regressions are 
employed.
Hypothesis one examines the changes in the magnitude 
of ERCs due to deregulation while hypothesis two examines 
the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation. Table 3 presents the results of the 
analysis for the full sample. It can be noted from panel 
A of table 3 that the maximum condition index is 31 for 
the full model pooled regression. Belsley et al. (1980) 
suggest that condition indexes in excess of 30 indicate 
multicollinearity problems. On the other hand, the 
maximum condition indexes of the mean adjusted and reduced 
model pooled regressions are eleven and four respectively.
‘“The null hypothesis that the residuals are 
homoskedastic is tested using the procedure developed by 
White (1980). The null is reject only when pooled 
regressions are estimated for the natural gas sample. In 
these cases t-statistics are calculated using White's 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
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Table 3
Results of various pooled and firm-specific regressions 
for the full sample. (A reciprocal function is used to 
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation.)
Panel A: Pooled Maximum
a3+a/ a/ condition index
Fuir -0.148
(0.351)
-0.073
(0.626)
31
Mean adjusted** -0.281
(0.103)
-0.097
(0.522)
1 1
Reduced' -0.235
(0.061)
-0.074
(0.611)
4
Panel B: Firm-specific
a3+a4*’ a4"
Number of 
regressions 
with condition 
indexes > 30
Full' 0.608
(0.543)
1.859
(0.063)
35
Mean adjusted** 0.608
(0.543)
1.859
(0.063)
7
Reduced' -0.076
(0.947)
1.047
(0.297)
0
“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses). 
'’Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses) .
'Full model : CAR;, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q+a3ÜEiq*Di,+a4UEi,*Diq* ( l/T;,)
+a5RVL;q+agUE;/PERiq+a7UE;/INT;,+agUE;q*BETA;q+U;q.
‘Mean adjusted model : CAR,q = ag+â Diq+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*0;̂  
+a4UEi/D;q* ( 1/T,„) +ajRVLi,+a6UEi,* (PER,,-MPERi) +a7UE;,* (IN T ^ -M IN T ;)  
+agUE,,* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +U,,.
^Reduced model : CARj, = ao+a,Di,+a2ÜEiq+a3UEiq*Dj,+a4UEi,*Diq* (l/T;,)
+a;RVLjq+Ujq .
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well below the threshold of 30. Results in panel A of 
table 3 indicate that for the full sample the change in 
ERCs due to deregulation (â +â ) is not significantly 
different from zero for any of the three pooled regression 
model specifications. The coefficient to test the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation (â ) 
is also not significantly different from zero for any of 
the three pooled regression model specifications.
Panel B of table 3 presents the results of firm- 
specific regressions. Full, mean adjusted, and reduced 
model regressions are estimated for each sample firm. The 
maximum condition indexes are in excess of 30 for all 35 
firm-specific regressions for the full model while they 
are in excess of 30 for only seven firm-specific 
regressions for the mean adjusted model, and none is in 
excess of 30 for the reduced model. The t-statistics of
parameter estimates for each sample firm are then
aggregated to form a z-statistic according to equation 
(11) described in chapter three. It can be noted that the 
z-statistics calculated from the full model firm-specific 
regressions are the same as those calculated from the mean 
adjusted model firm-specific regressions. This can be 
explained by the way the mean adjusted model is
structured. The only difference between the full and the
mean adjusted models is the way the control variables are 
included in the regressions. For the full model control
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variables enter the regression as the raw data interacted 
with the unexpected earnings. For the mean adjusted model 
control variables enter the regression as the deviations 
from their respective firm-specific means interacted with 
the unexpected earnings. Since these firm-specific means 
are constant across observations when firm-specific 
regressions are estimated, parameter estimates and their 
standard errors from the full and the mean adjusted models 
are the same except for a;, the coefficient of the 
unexpected earnings variable. Therefore, the z-statistics 
aggregated for â +â  and â  from these two models are the 
same. However, since these firm-specific means are not 
constant across observations when pooled regressions are 
estimated, parameter estimates from the full and the mean 
adjusted model pooled regressions are not the same.
Results in panel B of table 3 indicate that the 
change in ERCs due to deregulation (â +â ) and the 
coefficient to test the intertemporal variation of ERCs 
following deregulation (â ) are again not significantly 
different from zero for any of the three model 
specifications. In summary, for the full sample both the 
change in ERCs due to deregulation and the intertemporal 
variation of ERCs following deregulation are found to be 
insignificant.
Table 4 presents the results of pooled regressions 
for samples disaggregated by industry. It can be noted
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Table 4
Results of various pooled regressions for samples 
disaggregated by industry. (A reciprocal function is used 
to model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation.)
Panel A: Airline Maximum
a,+a4' &4' condition
Full*’ -0.439 -0.290 33
(0.104) (0.233)
Mean adjusted' -0.524 -0.344 1 2
(0.057) (0.163)
Reduced** -0.363 -0.140 6
(0.073) (0.531)
Panel B: Natural gas
Full” -0.366 -0.070 41
(0.530)' (0.918)'
Mean adjusted' -0.443 0.028 7
(0.470)' (0.969)'
Reduced** -1.153 -0.718 5
(0.007)' (0.259)'
Panel C : Trucking
Full” -0.492 0.073 51
(0.288) (0.842)
Mean adjusted' -0.682 0.041 13
(0.151) (0.897)
Reduced** 0.064 0.077 3
(0.789) (0.797)
“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
Tull model : CAR;, = ao+aiDi,+a2UEj,+a3UEi,*Di,+a4UEi,*D,,,* (l/Tj,) 
+a5RVLi,+a6ÜEi,*PERi,+a7UE,-,* INTi,+agUE;,*BETAi,+Ui,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q+a3UEiq*Diq 
fa^UEiq^D;/ ( 1/T,q) +a5RVL,,+a6UE,„* (PERjq-MPERi) +a7UEj,* ( INTj^-M INTi) 
+agUE,„* (BETAj,-MBETAi) +U..,.
^Reduced model ; CAR̂ q = ao+a,Diq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*D;q+a4UEiq*D,q* (l/Tjq)
+ a;RVL;q+U;q .
'These p-values are determined using White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix since the 
null hypothesis that the errors are homoskedastic is 
rejected at the 0.05 level (the chi-square statistics are 
61.3, 57.5, and 24.8 for the full, the mean adjusted, and 
the reduced models respectively).
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that the maximum condition indexes are in excess of 30 for 
all three industry s sump les for the full model pooled 
regressions while they are not in excess of 30 for either 
the mean adjusted or the reduced model. The change in 
ERCs due to deregulation (â +â ) is not significantly 
different from zero for any of the three model 
specifications for any of the three industries except for 
the reduced model of the natural gas industry. When the 
reduced model is estimated for firms in the natural gas 
industry, â +â  is significantly negative which means that, 
contrary to expectations, ERCs are smaller after 
deregulation for natural gas firms. However, â +â  is not 
significantly different from zero for either the full or 
the mean adjusted model. In other words, the significant 
reduction in the magnitude of ERCs is not found when 
control variables are included in the models. As to â , it 
is again not significantly different from zero for any of 
the three model specifications for any of the three 
industries.
Table 5 presents the results of firm-specific 
regressions for samples disaggregated by industry.
Neither the change in ERCs due to deregulation (â +â ) nor 
the coefficient to test the intertemporal variation of 
ERCs following deregulation (â ) is significantly different 
from zero for any of the three model specifications for 
any of the three industries. In summary, after
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Table 5
Results of various firm-specific regressions for samples 
disaggregated by industry. (A reciprocal function is used 
to model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation.)
Panel A: Airlines 
Full"
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced**
Panel B: Natural gas 
Full"
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced**
Panel C: Trucking 
Full"
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced**
aj+a/
0.237 
(0.813) 
0.237 
(0.813) 
-0.636 
(0.525)
0.619
(0.541)
0.619
(0.541)
0.052
(0.959)
0.130
(0.897)
0.130
(0.897)
0.396
(0.692)
0.540
(0.589)
0.540
(0.589)
-0.232
(0.816)
1.412 
(0.158)
1.412 
(0.158)
1.169
(0.242)
1.180
(0.238)
1.180
(0.238)
0.700
(0.484)
Number of 
regressions 
with condition 
indexes > 3 0
9
1
0
16
4
0
10
2
0
‘Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses).
"Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q* ( 1/Tiq) 
+a5RVLi,+a6UEi,*PERjq+a7ÜEiq* INT,.,+agUEi,*BETAi,+U,.,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ag+a(Djq+â UEjq+agUEjq*0;̂ 
+a,UE;/Di/(l/Tiq) +a5RVLi,+asUEi,* (PERi„-MPERi) +a7ÜEi,* (INT;,-MINTi) 
+agUE,-,* (BETAjq-MBETAj) +U;,.
■•Reduced model : CAR;, = ao+a,Diq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Di<,+a4UE,„*Diq* (1/T,„)
+ajRVLiq+Uiq.
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controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence is 
found for a change in the magnitude of ERCs due to 
deregulation or for an intertemporal variation of ERCs 
following deregulation for the three industries 
investigated in this study.
It can be noted from the results presented so far 
that the coefficient to test the intertemporal variation 
of ERCs following deregulation (â ) is not significant in 
any of the regression models examined. As indicated in 
chapter three an alternative specification where a dummy 
variable which equals one for the first ten quarters in 
the post-deregulation period and equals zero otherwise is 
also used to test the change in ERCs after deregulation.
In this model specification, a step function, instead of a 
reciprocal function used previously, is used to model the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation. 
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis for the full 
sample. It can be noted that a< is again not significantly 
different from zero for any of the three model 
specifications for either pooled or firm-specific 
regressions. On the other hand, the change in ERCs due to 
deregulation (â +â ) is significantly negative when the 
reduced model pooled regression is estimated. However, 
this significant reduction in the magnitude of ERCs is 
again not found when control variables are included in the 
regression models. Furthermore, â +â  is not significantly
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Table 6
Results of various pooled and firm-specific regressions 
for the full sample. (A step function is used to model the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Pooled Maximum
as+a/ a/ condition index
Full" -0.105
(0.513)
-0.030
(0.721)
39
Mean adjusted** -0.221
(0.191)
-0.063
(0.444)
12
Reduced" -0.212
(0.000)
-0.071
(0.265)
5
Panel B: Firm-specific
a3+a4'> a,"
Number of 
regressions 
with condition 
indexes > 30
Full" -0.644 
(0.520)
0.172
(0.863)
34
Mean adjusted** -0.644
(0.520)
0.172
(0.863)
5
Reduced" -0.525
(0.600)
0.106
(0.916)
1
‘Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses). 
'’Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses) .
"Full model : CARj, = ao+aiDjq+a2UE,,,+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UEi,*Diq*Eiq+a5RVLiq
+a6UEi,*PERi,+a7ÜEi,*INTi,+agUEiq*BETAi,+Ui,.
‘Mean adjusted model : CAR;, = ao+aiDjq+a2UEiq+a3UE,q*D,v, 
+a4UE;q*D;q*Eiq+a3RVLiq+agUE;q* (PERj^-MPERj) ta^UEi,* (INTiq-M INTj)
tagUEjq* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +Uj,.
"Reduced model : CAR,,, = ao+aiD;q+a2UEjq+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UE;q*D|q*Ejq
tagRVLiq+Ujq.
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different from zero for any of the three firm-specific 
regression models.
The results of pooled regressions for samples 
disaggregated by industry are presented in table 7. It 
can be noted that â  is again not significantly different 
from zero for any of the three model specifications for 
any of the three industries. On the other hand, â +â  is 
significantly negative when reduced model pooled 
regressions are estimated for both the airline sample and 
the natural gas sample. However, â +â  is not 
significantly different from zero for either the full or 
the mean adjusted model. For the trucking sample, â +â  is 
not significant for any of the three model specifications. 
The results of firm-specific regressions for individual 
industry samples are presented in table 8 . Neither â +â  
nor â  is significantly different from zero for any of the 
three model specifications for any of the three industry 
samples. In summary, after controlling for the effects of 
covariates, no evidence is found for a change in the 
magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation or for an 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.
Hypothesis three examines the differential effects of 
deregulation on ERCs for the three industries 
investigated. The changes in the magnitude of ERCs due to 
deregulation are compared pairwise among the three 
industries. Table 9 presents the results of the analysis
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Table 7
Results of various pooled regressions for seumples 
disaggregated by industry. (A step function is used to 
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation.)
Panel A: Airline Maximum
as+a/ a/ condition
Full” -0 . 2 0 2 -0.059 47
(0.479) (0.653)
Mean adjusted' -0 . 2 1 1 -0.058 15
(0.463) (0.661)
Reduced** -0.215 -0.089 6
(0.027) (0.282)
Panel B: Natural gas
Full” -0.036 0.676 33
(0.917)' (0.296)'
Mean adjusted' -0.223 0.638 8
(0.534)' (0.328)'
Reduced"* -0.675 0.283 7
(0.007)' (0.646)'
Panel C: Trucking
Full” -0.491 -0.009 48
(0.292) (0.973)
Mean adjusted' -0.700 0 . 0 0 2 15
(0.125) (0.995)
Reduced** 0.013 0.023 6
(0.913) (0.934)
“Parameter estimates (p-values in parentheses).
•’Full model : CAR;, = ao+a;D;q4-a2UE;q+a3UEiq*D;q+â UEk,*Diq*E;q+a;RVL;q
+a6UEi,*PERiq+a7UE,.,* INT,„+agUEi,*BETAi,+Ui,.
“Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+aiDiq+a2UE;q+a3UE,,,*Diq 
+a4UEi,*Di,*Ei,+a5RVLiq+a6UE.„* (PER,,-MPERi) +a7ÜE;,* (INTĵ -MINT;) 
+agUE;,* (BETAiq-MBETAi) +U;,.
‘Reduced model : CAR,-, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEiq+a3UEiq*Diq+a4UEiq*D,q*Ei,
+a5RVL;q+Ujq .
'These p-values are determined using White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix since the 
null hypothesis that the errors are homoskedastic is 
rejected at the 0.05 level (the chi-square statistics are 
62.2, 56.3, and 27.9 for the full, the mean adjusted, and 
the reduced models respectively).
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Table 8
Results of various firm-specific regressions for samples 
disaggregated by industry. (A step function is used to 
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation.)
Number of 
regressions
Panel A: Airlines 
Full'’
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced''
Panel B: Natural gas 
Puli'*
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced**
Panel C: Trucking 
Full'’
Mean adjusted' 
Reduced**
as+a/
-0.209
(0.834)
-0.209
(0.834)
-0.393
(0.694)
-0.661
(0.509)
-0.661
(0.509)
-0.263
(0.793)
-0.171
(0.864)
-0.171
(0.864)
-0.276
(0.783)
a/
-0.993
(0.321)
-0.993
(0.321)
-1.413
(0.158)
1.822
(0.068)
1.822
(0.068)
1.795
(0.073)
-1.041
(0.298)
-1.041
(0.298)
-0.731
(0.465)
with condition 
indexes > 3 0
9
1
0
15
2
1
10
2
0
‘Z-statistics (p-values in parentheses).
■’Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEi,+a3UE,q*D;q+a4UE,,,*Diq*Ei<,+a5RVL,-q 
+a6UEiq*PERi,+a7UE..,*INT,.,+agUE;,*BETAi,+Ui,.
'Mean adjusted model : CARj, = ao+aiD;q+a2UE;q+a3UÊ *D;q 
+a4UE;q*Diq*Eiq+a;RVL;q+agUEiq* (PERjq-MPER;) ta ^ U E ;/ (IN T jq -M IN T;) 
tagUEiq* (BETAjq-MBETAi) +U^.
'Reduced model : CAR,-, = ao+a,D;q+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q*Ejq
+a;RVL;q+Uiq .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
when a reciprocal function is used to model the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation. 
Panel A provides the results of comparing parameter 
estimates from pooled regressions. One of the comparisons 
shows a significant difference in the changes in ERCs due 
to deregulation between two industries. This is the case 
where there is a significant decrease in ERCs for the 
natural gas sample and an essentially no change in ERCs 
for the trucking sample. However, this significant 
difference in the changes in ERCs due to deregulation is 
not found when control variables are included in the 
regression model. Panel B provides the results of 
comparing the z-statistics of parameter estimates 
aggregated from firm-specific regressions. None of the 
comparisons of the z-statistics shows significant 
differences in the changes in ERCs due to deregulation 
among the three industries.
Table 10 presents the results of the analysis when a 
step function is used to model the intertemporal variation 
of ERCs following deregulation. Similar to the results 
presented in table 9, a significant difference in the 
changes in ERCs due to deregulation is found between 
natural gas and trucking sample firms but again only when 
reduced model pooled regressions are estimated. In 
summary, from the results presented in tables 9 and 10 it 
can be concluded that after controlling for the effects of
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Table 9
Results of pairwise comparisons of the changes in ERCs due 
to deregulation (â +â  in the regressions) among the three 
industries.* (A reciprocal function is used to model the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Comparisons of parameter estimates from pooled 
regressions (p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas Air-Truck Gas-Truck
Full” -0.073 0.053 0.126
(0.909) (0.921) (0 .8 6 6 )
Mean adjusted” -0.081 0.158 0.239
(0.904) (0.773) (0.758)
Reduced** 0.790 -0.427 -1.217
(0.095) (0.172) (0.013)
Panel B: Comparisons of z-statistics of parameter 
estimates aggregated from firm-specific regressions 
(p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas Air-Truck Gas-Truck
Full” -0.382 0.107 0.489
(0.787) (0.939) (0.729)
Mean adjusted” -0.382 0.107 0.489
(0.787) (0.939) (0.729)
Reduced** —0 . 6 8 8 -1.032 -0.344
(0.627) (0.465) (0.808)
The three industries are: Air = airline; Gas = natural 
gas; Truck = trucking.
'’Full model : CAR;, = ao+aiDi,+a2ÜEi,+a3UE,,,*Di,+a4UEiq*Diq* (1/T,-,) 
+a5RVLi,+a6ÜEi,*PERi,+a7UEi,* INT,„+agTJE,,,*BETA,,+Ui,.
‘’Mean adjusted model : CAR,,, = ao+aiDiq+a2UEi,+a3UEj<,*Diq 
+a4UEi,*Di,* ( 1/T,q) +a;RVLiq+agUEiq* (PER,„-MPERi) H-â UEj,* (INT;,-MINTi)
+agUEi,* (BETAiq-MBETAj) +0 ;,.
‘Reduced model : CAR,,, = ao+a,Diq+a2UE;q4-a3UE;q*D;q+a4UEjq*D;q* ( 1/T;q)
tasRVLiq+Ujq.
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Table 10
Results of pairwise comparisons of the changes in ERCs due 
to deregulation (â +â  in the regressions) among three 
industries.* (A step function is used to model the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation.)
Panel A: Comparisons of parameter estimates from pooled 
regressions (p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas Air-Truck Gas-Truck
Full'’ -0.166 0.289 0.455
(0.711) (0.596) (0.433)
Mean adjusted' 0 . 0 1 2 0.489 0.477
(0.979) (0.364) (0.411)
Reduced'* 0.460 -0.228 -0 . 6 8 8
(0.088) (0.138) (0.014)
Panel B: Comparisons of z-statistics of parameter 
estimates aggregated from firm-specific regressions 
(p-values in parentheses).
Air-Gas Air-Truck Gas-Truck
Full'’ 0.452 -0.038 -0.490
(0.749) (0.978) (0.729)
Mean Adjusted' 0.452 -0.038 -0.490
(0.749) (0.978) (0.729)
Reduced'* -0.130 -0.117 0.013
(0.927) (0.934) (0.993)
The three industries are: Air = airline; Gas = natural 
gas; Truck = trucking.
'’Full model : CARj, = ao+aiD;q+a2UE;q+a3UE;q*D;q+a4UEk,*D̂ *E;q+a;RVLiq
tagUEj/PERiq+a^UEi/INTiq+agUEi/BETAiq+Ujq.
'Mean adjusted model : CAR,,, = ag+a,Djq+â UEjq+â UEjq*0;̂
ta^UEi/Di/E iq+aiRVEiq+agUEi/ (PERj„-MPERi) +a7ÜEi,* (IN T j^ -M IN T i) 
tagUEiq* (BETAiq-MBETAj) +U;q.
‘Reduced model : CAR,-q = ao+a,D|q+a2UEiq+a3UEjq*D;q+a4UE;q*D;q*E;q
+a;RVLiq+Ujq .
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covariates, no evidence of a differential effect of 
deregulation on ERCs is found among the three industries 
examined in this study.
Summary
This chapter reports the results of the study. The 
first section discusses the results of the sample 
selection. The sample consists of 35 firms. Nine of them 
are airlines, sixteen are natural gas firms, and the 
remaining ten are trucking firms. The second section 
presents the results of the tests of research hypotheses. 
Reductions in the magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation 
are found in the airline and natural gas industries but 
only when reduced model pooled regressions are estimated. 
No evidence of an intertemporal variation of ERCs 
following deregulation is found. Significant differences 
in the changes in ERCs among the three industries examined 
are found only when reduced model pooled regressions are 
estimated. Therefore, the overall conclusion is that 
after controlling for the effects of covariates, no 
evidence is found for a significant impact of deregulation 
on ERCs.“
"The influence diagnostics procedures suggested by 
Belsley et al. (1980) are used to identify influential 
observations in various pooled regression models. 
Approximately one percent of the observations are 
identified as outliers. Pooled regression models are 
estimated after deleting these observations. The overall 
conclusion of the study is not altered.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter contains a summary of the study and the 
conclusions reached. Section one provides a brief 
overview of the study. The second section discusses the 
expected findings of the study. Results of the study are 
presented in section three. Section four contains the 
conclusions. The chapter closes with discussions of the 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research.
Overview of the Studv 
Many sectors of the United Stated economy have 
experienced deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
study examines how deregulation affects the 
informativeness of accounting earnings of firms in 
deregulation industries. In this study, the 
informativeness of accounting earnings is measured by the 
ERCs. The effects of deregulation on ERCs are examined 
by: (1) comparing ERCs before deregulation to those after 
deregulation to determine the changes in the magnitude of 
ERCs due to deregulation, (2) investigating the time 
series of ERCs after deregulation to determine the 
intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation, 
and (3) comparing the change in ERCs in one deregulated
71
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industry to that in another deregulated industry to 
determine the differential effects of deregulation.
Three industries (airline, natural gas, and trucking) 
that were deregulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
are examined. Sample firms in these industries are 
obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey.
Regression models are estimated to test the hypothesized 
effects of deregulation on ERCs. Variables found to be 
determinants of ERCs in previous research are included in 
some of the regression models to control for the effects 
of these variables on ERCs.
Expectations 
As applied to the context of this study, the 
theoretical models of Choi (1985), Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988), and Lev (1989) suggest that ERCs are 
positively related to the uncertainty associated with the 
future cash flows and negatively related to the variance 
of the noise in the earnings signals. Based on the 
arguments of Peltzman (1976), deregulation is expected to 
lead to a higher level of uncertainty, but deregulation is 
not expected to lead to noisier earnings signals.
Therefore, larger ERCs are expected after deregulation.
Lang (1991) suggests that the magnitude of the stock 
price responses to earnings is a positive function of the 
degree of uncertainty about the time series parameters of 
earnings. Deregulation subjects firms to a relatively new
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environment. Earnings numbers before deregulation will 
not necessarily reflect what can be expected following 
deregulation. Thus, after deregulation, uncertainty about 
the future prospects for the firm will be relatively high. 
As a longer series of earnings numbers after deregulation 
becomes available, uncertainty decreases and the magnitude 
of the stock price responses to earnings decreases. 
Therefore, ERCs are expected to decline over time 
following deregulation.
The increase in the uncertainty about a firm's future 
cash flows due to deregulation should depend on the scope 
and extent of deregulation. However, other factors (e.g., 
the ability of deregulated firms to cope with the changes 
in their operating environment) can also affect the 
magnitude of the increase in the uncertainty induced by 
deregulation. Therefore, no expectation is formed as to 
the order of the magnitude of the increase in ERCs of the 
three industries examined in this study.
Results
Hypothesis one examines the changes in the magnitude 
of ERCs due to deregulation. Contrary to expectations, 
reductions in the magnitude of ERCs are found in the 
airline and natural gas industries when reduced model 
pooled regressions are estimated. However, after 
controlling for the effects of covariates, no evidence of 
a change in the magnitude of ERCs due to deregulation is
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found. Hypothesis two examines the intertemporal 
variation of ERCs following deregulation. No evidence of 
an intertemporal variation of ERCs following deregulation 
is found. Hypothesis three examines the differential 
effects of deregulation on ERCs for the three industries 
investigated in this study. Significant differences in 
the changes in ERCs among the three industries are found 
only when reduced model pooled regressions are estimated. 
Therefore, after controlling for the effects of 
covariates, no evidence of a differential effect of 
deregulation on ERCs is found.
Conclusions
After controlling for the effects of covariates, no 
evidence is found for a significant impact of deregulation 
on ERCs. This result is surprising given the expected 
increase in uncertainty associated with the future cash 
flows induced by deregulation and the positive correlation 
between ERCs and uncertainty in the models developed by 
Choi (1985), Holthausen and Verrecchia (1989), and Lev 
(1989). However, there could be offsetting factors.
First, in the aforementioned models, ERCs are decreasing 
functions of the noise in the earnings signals, and 
deregulation may have increased this noise. Second, 
deregulation reduces industry barriers to entry and Biddle 
and Seow (1991) find evidence consistent with a positive 
correlation between ERCs and these same barriers.
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Furthermore, factors other than those included in this 
study could affect the magnitude of ERCs and could (at 
least partially) be responsible for the reported results.
Limitations
Certain limitations of the study must be recognized. 
First, evidence regarding the impact of (or in this case 
the lack thereof) deregulation on ERCs must be handled 
carefully. In order to determine the "true" impact of 
deregulation, one will have to know what would have 
happened without deregulation, and that is impossible. 
Second, even though deregulation dates are determined 
after reviewing legislative history and prior studies, the 
determination process is inherently subjective. Third, by 
including only firms followed by the Value Line, this 
study focuses on large and widely held firms. Therefore, 
the findings of this study may not be generalizable to 
other firms. Finally, multicollinearity is a concern in 
interpreting the results of the study especially those of 
the full model regressions— though, it should not a 
problem for the mean adjusted or the reduced model pooled 
regressions.
Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several suggestions for related future 
research. First, the regression models used in this study 
contain only a few variables that could have affected the 
stock market responses to earnings announcements. Models
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controlling for other firm characteristics or 
macroeconomic variables could be constructed to 
investigate the impact of deregulation. Second, a 
reciprocal and a step function are used in this study to 
model the intertemporal variation of ERCs following 
deregulation, other model specifications could certainly 
be used. Third, this study examines the impact of 
deregulation on ERCs on an industry level. Future 
research could investigate the impact of deregulation on a 
firm level. Individual firms may be affected by 
deregulation differently. If these effects are offsetting 
then they could be masked in an industry level study.
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